Georg Lukács wrote that “there is autonomy and'autonomy.'The one is a moment of life itself, the elevation of its richness and contradictory unity; the other is a rigidification, a barren self-seclusion, a self-imposed banishment from the dynamic overall connection.” Though Lukács'concern was with the conditions for the possibility of art, his distinction also serves as an apt description of the way that Hegel and Hegelians have contrasted their own interpretations of self-determination with that of Kant. But it has always been difficult to see how elevation is possible without seclusion, or how rigidification can be avoided without making the boundaries of the self so malleable that its autonomy looks like a mere cover for the power of external forces. Yeomans explores Hegel's own attempts to grapple with this problem against the background of Kant's attempts, in his theory of virtue, to understand the way that morally autonomous agents can be robust individuals with qualitatively different projects, personal relations, and commitments that are nonetheless infused with a value that demands respect. In a reading that disentangles a number of different threads in Kant's approach, Yeomans shows how Hegel reweaves these threads around the central notions of talent and interest to produce a tapestry of self-determination. Yeomans argues that the result is a striking pluralism that identifies three qualitatively distinct forms of agency or accountability and sees each of these forms of agency as being embodied in different social groups in different ways. But there is nonetheless a dynamic unity to the forms because they can all be understood as practical attempts to solve the problem of autonomy, and each is thus worthy of respect even from the perspective of other solutions. “Everyone recognizes the importance of Hegel's critique of Kantian morality as empty, but until now there has not been a fully worked out presentation of how Hegel's views in his discussion of Sittlichkeit actually provide the missing content. Yeomans has finally provided us with a reconstruction of Hegel's mature position that makes good on all the promissory notes that Hegel (and his commentators) gives in his famous descriptions of his alternative to Kantian ethics. Yeomans offers a compelling account of Hegel's view of individuality, societal differentiation and its roots in Kantian and Fichtean moral theory. The book will be a major contribution to the scholarship on Hegel's practical philosophy.”-Dean Moyar, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University “Yeomans'book is a subtle, detailed and original explication of some key ideas having to do with how Hegel's general philosophy of action (or theory of the nature of agency) relates to his social and political philosophy. It is attentive to Hegel's texts, and it ties its discussions into all the relevant contemporary themes in philosophy. It is very ambitious in its attempt to make Hegel's theory into a real competitor to other views that are currently in wide play in the philosophical world. It will very likely become one of the key texts in the secondary literature on Hegel.”-Terry Pinkard, University Professor of Philosophy, Georgetown University

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Yeomans, Christopher

Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

German Historical Institute London

Oxford Scholarship Online

United Kingdom and Ireland, United Kingdom

Feb 02, 2015

London, 2015

1, PS, 2015

producers:
ImageMagick 6.6.2-1 2010-05-27 Q16 http://www.imagemagick.org

Source title: The Expansion of Autonomy: Hegel's Pluralistic Philosophy of Action

Georg Lukcs wrote that "there is autonomy and 'autonomy.' The one is a moment of life itself, the elevation of its richness and contradictory unity; the other is a rigidification, a barren self-seclusion, a self-imposed banishment from the dynamic overall connection." Though Lukcs' concern was with the conditions for the possibility of art, his distinction also serves as an apt description of the way that Hegel and Hegelians have contrasted their own interpretations of self-determination with that of Kant. But it has always been difficult to see how elevation is possible without seclusion, or how rigidification can be avoided without making the boundaries of the self so malleable that its autonomy looks like a mere cover for the power of external forces.
Yeomans explores Hegel's own attempts to grapple with this problem against the background of Kant's attempts, in his theory of virtue, to understand the way that morally autonomous agents can be robust individuals with qualitatively different projects, personal relations, and commitments that are nonetheless infused with a value that demands respect. In a reading that disentangles a number of different threads in Kant's approach, Yeomans shows how Hegel reweaves these threads around the central notions of talent and interest to produce a tapestry of self-determination. Yeomans argues that the result is a striking pluralism that identifies three qualitatively distinct forms of agency or accountability and sees each of these forms of agency as being embodied in different social groups in different ways. But there is nonetheless a dynamic unity to the forms because they can all be understood as practical attempts to solve the problem of autonomy, and each is thus worthy of respect even
from the perspective of other solutions.
"Everyone recognizes the importance of Hegel's critique of Kantian morality as empty, but until now there has not been a fully worked out presentation of how Hegel's views in his discussion of Sittlichkeit actually provide the missing content. Yeomans has finally provided us with a reconstruction of Hegel's mature position that makes good on all the promissory notes that Hegel (and his commentators) gives in his famous descriptions of his alternative to Kantian ethics. Yeomans offers a compelling account of Hegel's view of individuality, societal differentiation and its roots in Kantian and Fichtean moral theory. The book will be a major contribution to the scholarship on Hegel's practical philosophy."-Dean Moyar, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University
"Yeomans' book is a subtle, detailed and original explication of some key ideas having to do with how Hegel's general philosophy of action (or theory of the nature of agency) relates to his social and political philosophy. It is attentive to Hegel's texts, and it ties its discussions into all the relevant contemporary themes in philosophy. It is very ambitious in its attempt to make Hegel's theory into a real competitor to other views that are currently in wide play in the philosophical world. It will very likely become one of the key texts in the secondary literature on Hegel."-Terry Pinkard, University Professor of Philosophy, Georgetown University

Cover 1
The Expansion
of Autonomy 4
Copyright 5
Contents 6
Acknowledgments 8
Abbreviations 10
Introduction 14
Part I General Framework 22
1 Virtue and Individuality 24
§1: Virtue as the Individualization of Duty 28
§2: Virtue as Duties that Persons Have in Virtue of
also Being Animals 36
§3: Virtue as the Fight Between Reason and the Inclinations 40
§4: The Development of Talents as a Duty of Virtue 50
2 The Empty Formalism Objection in the Context of
Individualized Virtue 61
3 Fichte and the Problem of Individual Effectiveness 73
4 A Moral Psychology of Talents and Interests 82
§1: Talents and Interests 82
§2: Subjectivity and Objectivity 95
Part II Experiments in Individuality 108
5 The Changing Nature of Objective Content 110
§1: The Distinctively Moral Form of Objective Content 110
§2: Farmers 126
§3: Soldiers 140
6 Talents and the Shaping of Action 148
§1: Talent and Intentional Self-Knowledge 148
§2: Craft and Industrial Producers 162
§3: Scholars 174
7 The Concreteness of the Good 176
§1: The Effectiveness of the Good 176
§2: The Public Estate 194
§3: Merchants 200
Part III Conclusion 206
8 Hegelian Self-Determination 208
§1: The Reciprocal Inversion of Moral and Material Ends 209
§2: Character as Medium and Process of Expression 216
§3: Non-Empiricist Action Explanations 218
§4: Objective Criteria and Deception 222
Bibliography 236
Index 240

In One Of His Pieces Of Literary Criticism Georg Lukács Wrote That 'there Is Autonomy And 'autonomy.' The One Is A Moment Of Life Itself, The Elevation Of Its Richness And Contradictory Unity; The Other Is A Rigidification, A Barren Self-seclusion, A Self-imposed Banishment From The Dynamic Overall Connection.' But It Has Always Been Difficult To See How Rigidification Can Be Avoided Without Making The Boundaries Of The Self So Malleable That Its Autonomy Looks Like A Sham. Yeomans Explores Hegel's Own Attempts To Grapple With This Problem Against The Background Of Kant's Attempts, In His Theory Of Virtue, To Understand The Way That Morally Autonomous Agents Can Be Robust Individuals With Qualitatively Different Projects, Personal Relations And Commitments That Are Nonetheless Infused With A Value That Demands Respect. Virtue And Individuality -- The Empty Formalism Objection In The Context Of Individualized Virtue -- Fichte And The Problem Of Individual Effectiveness -- A Moral Psychology Of Talents And Interests -- The Changing Nature Of Objective Content -- Talents And The Shaping Of Action -- The Concreteness Of The Good -- Hegelian Self-determination. Christopher Yeomans. Includes Bibliographical References And Index.

Yeomans reconstructs Hegel's expansion of Kant's notion of autonomy and argues that the result is a striking pluralism in moral psychology and the concept of action.

2025-10-27