[bookmarks added]Simplicity is often cited as a compelling factor in deciding which of several competing theories it is most reasonable to believe. Yet, the nature of simplicity has remained mysterious, in spite of the efforts of philosophers to explain what it is about theories, hypotheses, and explanations, that makes ’ them simple. Equally opaque is the justification for using simplicity as a criterion for belief.Professor Sober in this book attempts to solve these problems by first defining a concept of informativeness. He then argues that simplicity is informativeness, and shows that this theory illuminates our intuitive judgements about the simplicity of a variety of hypotheses. He examines very general inferential policies that seem to embody our taste for simplicity and devotes special attention to some issues in contemporary linguistics and psychology of perception. In the course of elaborating the theory, he discusses the idea of natural properties and natural kinds and tries to show their connection with simplicity. Other topics that he examines in the book include aesthetic simplicity, the simplicity of formal systems, and the’ nature ot justification.Elliott Sober graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1969, and worked for four years as a research student at the University of Cambridge and Harvard University He is now Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin.

Elliott Sober

IRL Press at Oxford University Press

Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

German Historical Institute London

Clarendon library of logic and philosophy, Reprinted, Oxford, 2003

United Kingdom and Ireland, United Kingdom

1, PS, 1975

Bibliography: p. [180]-185.
Includes index.

<p><P>Attempts to show that the simplicity of a hypothesis can be measured by attending to how well it answers certain kinds of questions.</p>

2025-08-15