The aim of this study is to show how the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and the later Wittgenstein serve to establish, in very similar ways, (1) that subjects (persons) and what is subject-dependent, or in short, 'subjectivity', must be categorically distinguished from objects and what is subject-independent, or in short 'objectivity' and (2) that the 'sense' of the world as perceived, including linguistic sense, is a matter of the appearance of things and is therefore perception-dependent, and as such is in the category of subjectivity, not objectivity.
The first claim is established not only by a study of the content of the arguments of the two philosophers, but also by a study of the form of their arguments: the kind of fallacy detection they deploy against their opponents exploits a logic dictated by the subject matter.
In the course of examining a wide range of issues in meta- physics, epistemology, and the philosophies of mind, language, and mathematics, the 'Gestalt Philosophy' of Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty can be seen to constitute a new sort of 'anti-realism'.

lgrsnf/Sense and Subjectivity A Study of Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty (Brill's Studies in Epistemology, Psychology and Psychiatry) [3751284].pdf

Sense And Subjectivity: A Study Of Wittgenstein And Merleau-ponty (brill's Studies In Epistemology, Psychology And Psychiatry)

Philip G. Dwyer; M.A. Notturno

Philip Michael Dwyer

by Philip Dwyer

Koninklijke Brill N.V.

E. J. Brill

Brill's studies in epistemology, psychology, and psychiatry,, v. 2, Leiden, New York, Netherlands, 1990

Netherlands, Netherlands

August 1997

Includes bibliographical references (p. [216]-219) and indexes.

Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of Contents
Preface
List of Abbreviations
I. Merleau-Ponty’s Presupposition Arguments
Introduction
The Presupposition Argument as a Transcendental Argument
The Presupposition Argument Without the Transcendental Point
(i) The world as perceived and the Gestalt
(ii) Attempted derivations of sense
(iii) Gestalt qualities
(iv) The sense of the Gestalt and intentional sense
(v) A final example of Merleau-Ponty’s presupposition argument
Summary
II. Merleau-Ponty’s Transcendence Arguments
Introduction
The Transcendence Fallacy Regarding Experience, or Phenomenological Idleness
(i) A preliminary note on phenomenological description
(ii) “The prejudice of the objective world”
The Transcendence Fallacy concerning the World as Perceived, or Idle Determinacy
Summary
III. Wittgenstein and the Transcendence and Presupposition Arguments
Introduction
The Transcendence and Presupposition Arguments Applied to Psychological Phenomena
IV. Wittgenstein’s Application of the Transcendence and Presupposition Arguments to Language
Platonism and Tractarianism as Objectivism, or the Traditional Prejudices and the Return to Phenomena
Signs and Sense
Analysis
Simples
Family Resemblance
Ostensive Definition
Rules, Explanation and Understanding
Private Language
(i) The first private language argument
(ii) The second private language argument
Concluding Unscientific Corroboration
V. Language, Sense and the Gestalt
Introduction
Language and Music
Gestures
Physiognomy
Seeing-as and Rule-following
What is the Meaning of a Word?
VI. Merleau-Ponty and Language
VII. Mathematics as a Gestalt Phenomenon and the Issue of Indeterminacy
Introduction
Wittgenstein on Mathematics
Indeterminacy in Mathematics and Other Fields
Logical Analysis and Ontological Prejudice
VIII. Anti-Psychologism and Scepticism
Introduction
Frege and Descartes
An Ambiguity about “Psychologism”
Wittgensteinian Psychologism
Scepticism and Anti-psychologism: “Two-Kinds” Theses
Unwitting Sceptics
IX. Natural History and Existence
Introduction
Transcendental Arguments in Wittgenstein
Natural History and Existence
Language and Freedom
References
Index of Names
Index of Subjects

The philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and the later Wittgenstein are shown to yield a common position opposing 'realist' attempts to reduce appearance, sense, and meaning to perception-independent objects and relations. Their 'Gestalt Philosophy' thus constitutes a new form of 'anti- realism'.

2024-07-05